lntrodluction
Hubert Dreyfus claims that traditional AI research is a degenerating research programme in the sense developed by Imre Lakatos. Using the computerized chess system Deep Thought as an example, we argue that AI research is actually a progressive programme, reaching expert levels of performance using techniques of deep heuristic search that Dreyfus has characterized as hopeless. On the other hand, Dreyfus can offer no plausible, concrete alternatives for implementing the holistic processes that he thinks underlie cognition. Non-symbolic devices, such as holograms and connectionist networks, are shown to be unsuitable for his purposes. Although current opinion about Dreyfus in the AI community is mixed, given the success of symbolic AI in areas where Dreyfus predicted failure, his long-term influence on the field will probably be minimal. This is not to suggest that all the important questions regarding symbol-based approaches to AI have been settled. There is ongoing, vigorous debate in this area, much of it quite independent of Dreyfus. We argue merely that, given the rather fundamental objections Dreyfus has to symbol-based AI, its success in particula:r areas where he predicted failure is a serious challenge to his position.
In the re-issuance of his notorious book What Computers Still Can't Do, Hubert Dreyfus offers not so much a continuation of his attack on artificial intelligence research as a eulogy presented over AI's grave. In yet another appended introduction (there are now three printed serially in this edition), he invokes "a view of a bygone period of history", and characterizes "Good Old Fashioned AI" (the phrase is Haugeland's) as a degenerating research programme, in the sense developed by Imre Lakatos [p. ix] and [12] . According to Dreyfus, researchers are abandoning the field in droves, and funding is evaporating as AI finds itself increasingly incapable of realizing its research goals.
Our assessment of the state of artificial intelligence research is not as dire as Dreyfus'. Indeed, we are guardedly optimistic about the field's long-term prospects. Certainly, artificial intelligence research has its share of problems (perhaps even more than its share), against which Dreyfus lays a barrage of criticisms. However, unlike Dreyfus, we do not see these problems as representing fundamental limitations to AI, at least regarding cognitive performance. (We leave aside even thornier issues such as whether computers can exhibit selfconsciousness or emotive capacities.) More particularly, and more importantly, we do not see AI as a degenerating research programme in the sense developed by Lakatos.
We think it is worthwhile meeting Dreyfus on grounds of his own choosing in order to assess the state of AI research, and Lakatos' methodology makes a useful context for the comparisons we draw in our argument. In broad sweep, after we briefly describe Lakatos' methodology of research programmes, we will compare two different AI research approaches involving machine chess-one of which Dreyfus should find fairly sympathetic to his own views, the other of which he roundly criticizes. Our conclusion is that, in general, the approach favored by Dreyfus actually fares less well (is less progressive) than the one he criticizes.
Lakatos: the methodology of research programmes
One way of viewing Lakatos' methodology is as a reaction against Karl Popper's falsificationism [13] and a compromise with Thomas Kuhn's doctrine of scientific revolutions [ll] . Although these views are fairly familiar, it is worth rehearsing them briefly here. Popper argues for a strict falsificationism in which, given that we cannot conclusively confirm a general scientific theory, the best strategy is to attempt vigorously to disconfirm theories by subjecting them to a series of critical experiments. The task of science is essentially negative, and our claims to knowledge are radically contingent, being limited to those theories not yet eliminated. Kuhn, on the other hand, argues that scientific research is mediated by "paradigms", concrete examples of scientific success that implicitly provide research strategies and methodologies. On this view, the task of science is not to ruthlessly eliminate theories, but to apply them in progressively wider domains. Paradigms go unchallenged until increasingly pervasive failures precipitate a scientific crisis, causing the collapse of an old paradigm and the rise of a new paradigm. However, because a shift of paradigms requires a radical gestalt shift in the way scientists view the world, paradigms are incommensurable and cannot be rationally evaluated relative to one another.
In contrast, Imre Lakatos develops a methodology of research programmes [12] . In his view, what are evaluated in science are not individual theories or paradigms, but historically developing series of closely-related theories dubbed "research programmes". Research programmes are identified by a "hard core" of centrally-important hypotheses that are relatively insulated from criticism (similar to Kuhn's paradigms); modifications are generally limited to a "protective belt" of ancillary hypotheses [12, p. 41 . A "positive heuristic" associated with the programme incorporates strategies for dealing with anomalies and generating novel app!lications of the hard core.
Contrary to Popper, Lakatos argues that there is no "instant rationality" whereby a theory may be eliminated by a single critical experiment [12, p. 61 . Rather, competing research programmes must be evaluated relative to one another over a protracted period. As Lakatos says, ". . . there is no refutation without a better theory" [12, p. 61 . Further, contrary to Kuhn, there is not a single crisis-punctuated series of paradigms, but rather multiple simultaneouslycompeting research programmes, some of which gradually win out over others.
Research programmes are evaluated according to whether they are degenerating or progressive. Degenerating programmes essentially are those that predict no new facts:, but rather engage only in ad hoc modifications. An example of a degenerating programme was the Ptolemaic system of planetary motion. Although an increasingly elaborate series of epicycles was able to accommodate new facts of pl,anetary motion, the telling point for Lakatos is that such modifications came only after the fact. No new facts or predictions of planetary motion were forthcoming from the research programme itself.
On the other hand, progressive programmes predict new, unexpected facts. For instance, not only did general relativity theory explain, in a way superior to its rivals, previously-known facts such as the precession of the orbit of Mercury-it also predilcted unexpected facts like the bending of light in a gravitational field ]12, P. 51.
Our purpose in this paper, then, is to compare the performance of rival research programmes over time, in the manner suggested by Lakatos. Although Dreyfus himself is not an AI researcher, there has been a fair amount of research done that is at least compatible with many of his essential views-enough to construct ;an outline of a research programme. For reasons that we will explain, the basis we have chosen for comparison is computer chess. We argue that on the basis of performance and implementation, particularly in comparison to "Dreyfus' " alternative programme, traditional AI is not degenerating.
Chess: programs for a progressive programme
In What Computers Still Can't Do, Dreyfus presents a picture of traditional AI research that is virtually stagnant. However, while it is true that progress has not been as dramatic as predicted by early enthusiasts of AI, there has been steady progress. 13y any objective measure, in virtually every major field of investigation (such as ordinary language comprehension, visual perception, game playing, machine learning), programs now perform better than they did when the book first appeared. Merely by dint of faster machines with larger memories, and more efficient programming languages, we would expect at least marginal progress-but there have also been important conceptual advances. However, because we cannot canvas the entire range of AI research here, we have chosen one signal area for consideration-computer chess. We have chosen it for a number of reasons. First, it is an area in which research alternatives at least compatible with many of Dreyfus' views have been given serious consideration. Many researchers have been engaged in attempting to make computers play chess "the way people do". Second, alternative research approaches in computer chess are fairly easily distinguishable. Even when combined in a single program, the differences between, for instance, knowledge-based or heuristic search approaches are evident. Third, progress in computer chess can be straightforwardly gauged. Programs can play against one another and against human opponents to obtain a chess rating. Overall progress of one approach compared with another is determined simply by the rating of the best program at any one time. Finally, computer chess is an area that receives considerable attention from Dreyfus.
Heuristic search: problems and prospects
At this time, the best computer chess player is Deep Thought, a machine that plays chess at the grandmaster level, but in a way quite unlike that of human beings [lo] . If this seems surprising to Dreyfus, no doubt it is also surprising to others who, writing at about the time of the publication of the earlier, revised edition of What Computers Can't Do, expressed opinions similar to his. For instance, in 1977, Neil Charness, echoing Henry Higgins, asked, "Why can't a computer be more like a man?", arguing that the best hope for expert computer play lay in designing programs that closely emulated human methods of play [l] .
At the time, this seemed like a reasonable position. Programs based on heuristic search seemed to be running into a fundamental barrier, namely, the familiar problem of combinatorial explosion. The deepening searches of these programs quickly reached a point of diminishing returns in which the advantages of increasing look-ahead were negated by the increasing amount of time required to generate and evaluate the expanding branches of a search tree. Given the overwhelming size of the total space to be searched, dramatic increases in the proportion of possible moves that could be considered seemed unlikely. Even worse, those modest increases in search efficiency that could be achieved seemed to make little difference in performance. As Charness said of the programs of the time, "Adding a few plies [to the search] did not produce tremendous changes in performance" [ 1, pp. 36-371.
For Dreyfus, the problems encountered in trying to program computers to play chess were not only expected, but, indeed, exemplified the fundamental limitations of machine intelligence he already suspected. These limitations seemed particularly clear to him when the heuristic search methods of computers were contrasted with the way human beings play chess.
HumIan play: patterns and perspicuous grouping
Some early workers in human chess research believed that the overall level of human play also depended upon depth of search and memory. The chess master was envisioned as a sort of human calculating machine, considering many more combinations to much greater depths than those of novices. The astonishing truth, discovered by de Groot, was that chess masters and novices considered roughly the same :number of combinations, extended to about the same depth of search [l] . The primary difference was that chess masters considered the more important combinations.
This capacity seemed to rest on the ability of the chess master to see the board in terms of meaningful patterns that had been encountered in previous games. For instance, when de Groot asked masters and novices to reconstruct board positions from memory, chess masters performed considerably better than novices when the positions were like those that might be encountered in actual games. However, masters and novices performed about equally well when the positions were essentially random. Furthermore, errors made by masters tended to be systematic, preserving important relationships among pieces, as when a pinned and pinning piece might both be displaced in the same direction along a single file so that the first piece remained pinned.
Herbert Simon argued that the patterns recognized by chess masters were composed of "chunks" that represented meaningful relationships among groups of pieces such as castlings, pawn structures, pinned and protected pieces, etc. If short-term memory capacity is about seven meaningful items, and if each chess chunk incorporates about three or four pieces, then the chess master can recognize #and remember 21 positions while the novice can remember only seven. Simon also concluded that an expert chess player would need to be familiar with about 50,000 different patterns. Expert players become familiar with these patterns tlhrough many years of experience and practice. Furthermore, these patterns are apparently directly associated with remembered strategies and patterns o:E play that have proven successful in the past.
These riesults are sympathetic with Dreyfus' own analysis. For instance, he argues that when human chess adepts play the game, they do not examine every piece and every possible variation of moves. Rather, they focus initially on certain regions of the board, and only within those constraints examine specific pieces and possible moves. Pieces are not perceived as being disparately scattered about the board, but organized into "lines of force" and "areas of threat". This human ability to "zero in" on significant regions-which Dreyfus calls "perspicuous grouping"--allows human players to escape the combinatorial explosion that overwhehns the explicit "counting out" that he claims is the only approach open to formal Icomputer systems.
Deep Thought: the heuristic search response
Given the difficulties involved in heuristic search, how does Deep Thought accomplish the level of play that it does? The answer is by pushing the depth of search farther than has been done before. Deep Thought does this through a combination of faster hardware and a search strategy called singular extension.
Deep Thought's basic hardware contains 250 dedicated processor chips that allow it to search 500,000 positions per second. However, the program's strength also lies in a search strategy that its developers call "singular extension". Roughly, this strategy causes the program to search an extra ply in any situation where the program sees only a single good reply-that is, where moves are forced.
What is particularly interesting is that a sufficiently deep search is able to compensate for the relatively small amount of chess knowledge incorporated in Deep Thought. This indicates that, to a significant extent, Deep Thought has been able to overcome the problem known as the "horizon effect".
The horizon effect arises (and derives its name) from the fact that a computer program using heuristic search is literally blind to anything beyond the terminal nodes of the search, which can sometimes lead to catastrophically bad play. As an extreme case, a search that extended to more than a couple of plies would be unable to avoid even the simplest traps or develop anything but the most rudimentary lines of play. However, similar fiascos can also arise during more extensive searches, for instance, if the search is terminated in the middle of a piece exchange, causing the program to sacrifice pieces to no advantage. This is why most programs incorporate an evaluation of a position's "quiescence". Search is allowed to terminate only on relatively "stable" positions and is extended further in positions involving such dynamic situations as ongoing piece exchanges.
However, the quiescence of a chess position is often difficult to evaluate, leaving chess programs with peculiar lacunae in their play that can be exploited by human players. These shortcomings are what prompted Charness' comment, quoted above, that adding a ply or two to the search of earlier programs did not affect their level of play very much, because the horizon effect still fell prey to the foresight of human players.
A search of moderate depth can push back the horizon effect enough to avoid at least some of the more obvious blunders. However, with Deep Thought, the horizon seems to have been pushed back far enough to avoid even some of the fundamental shortcomings of previous programs. In a nutshell, the advantage Deep Thought has over its predecessors is its ability to see more clearly the consequences of its and its opponent's moves.
Evaluating the programme: from degenerating to progressive
Deep Thought is clearly a vindication for the traditional AI programme of heuristic search. However, the evaluation of this approach during its interim period was understandably grim. The refrain that "just one or two more ply" would relieve the systematic deficits revealed in search programs by their human opponents must have sounded like the special pleadings of a degenerating programme trying to rationalize its failures. As Charniak and McDermott said in 1985, . . . it is tempting to say that sheer speed will no longer suffice, and that more knowledge of chess, or something else, is needed. But, in fact, nobody knows. Perhaps looking ahead another ply or two will do the job [2, p. 2931.
In fact, looking ahead another ply or two does the job in a surprisingly regular way. It turns out that starting with the computer program Belle, which looks ahead about 5 plies and has a rating of about 1550, adding another ply of search adds abou.t 200 points to a program's rating. Fig. 1 illustrates this virtually linear relationship. Deep Thought, at about 10 plies, has a rating between 2600 and 2700. Relatively straightforward improvements in the system, anticipated by Hsu et al. [lOI, should increase its look ahead to 14 or 15 plies. If the above relationship holds, these improvements will put it beyond world champion Kasparov's rating of about 2900.
Naturally, no one knows whether this approximate relationship will continue to hold. Most of this uncertainty stems from our lack of understanding of what precisely underlies increasing human chess skill. As Daniel Crevier discusses in a related context, a difference in rating of 200 indicates that the higher-rated player will win 75% of the time against the lower-rated player [3, p. 2281 . However, what exactly accounts for this increased skill? For instance, we know that human chess experts are familiar with more chess patterns than are novices, but the precise relationship between rating and number of familiar patterns is unknown. The relationship might turn out to be radically nonlinear, so that the difficulty of passing from Deep Thought's current rating to that of Kasparov is much more difficult than the territory so far traversed by computers. Although the six data points pravided by early Belle through Deep Thought make this seem unlikely, only the future will tell precisely. However, what does seem fairly clear is that the strategy of increasingly deep heuristic search will continue to yield improved chess play.
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Belle Belle Belle
HiTech Deep Thought Fig. 1 . Depth of search versus ratings (see [lo] ).
The emulationist programme
Attempts to design computers to play chess in a way similar to how human beings play chess-the emulationist programme-have not been neglected. For example, in a 1973 Scientific American article, Albert Zobrist and Frederic Carson Jr describe a computer program that uses generalized "snapshots" of chess situations to guide its selection of moves [16] . The authors of the program say they explicitly intended these snapshots to correspond to the "chunks" described by Simon.
More recently, David Wilkins has written a program called PARADISE that incorporates about 200 production rules, representing various kinds of chess knowledge, to guide a relatively modest search [14] . However, PARADISE does not play chess at nearly the level of Deep Thought.
Comparing programmes
We do not think that the relative lack of success of the emulationist programme indicates any fundamental limitations of the programme, and there is no reason to think that further research will not yield progress. However, there are some underlying factors, mostly involving hardware advances and implementations, that help account for the progress in the search programme.
Recall that, according to Lakatos, every research programme has an associated positive heuristic that is supposed to provide strategies for dealing with anomalies and extending the applications of the hard core. If we take the essential hypothesimr hard core-of the search programme to be that a sufficiently deep search can compensate for lack of knowledge, then the essential strategy of the positive heuristic is straightforwardly to search for methods that extend the depth of search. This is fortunate in two ways. First, the fundamentals of search are well-understood, including strategies for efficiently pruning large search trees, such as alpha-beta searching. The development of the singular extension strategy used by Deep Thought was an important advance in a setting where similar discoveries have already been made and can be readily implemented. Second, a straightforward way of extending searches is to use faster machines. The positive heuristic of the search programme is well-positioned to exploit the advances in speed made possible by microchip technology. Deep Thought capitalizes precisely on improved search strategies and increased speed. Fig. 2 shows graphically the rough structure of the heuristic search programme. Naturally, it is not intended to be exhaustive, and one might quibble about the exact assignment of elements to hard core or positive heuristic. Interestingly, although he charges AI with being degenerating, Dreyfus himself provides no such Lakatosian analysis of AI research programmes.
On the other hand, the emulationist programme is not well-positioned to exploit recent hardware advances. Increased speed and memory size of computers cannot benefit a knowledge-based approach if the basic knowledge required is not forthcoming. One of the remaining impediments to the emulationist programme is that we still do not understand adequately the knowledge that humans use to play chess, much less how to effectively implement this knowledge in a working program.
Given the current state of the art, we do not see how Dreyfus' claim that AI is a degenerating programme is justified. Indeed, we venture the modest prediction that research approaches that are able to exploit forthcoming advances in computer hardware, such as increased speed, will continue to show progress.
General lessons

What chess reveals
Dreyfus might argue that the study of computer chess has little to tell us about more general issues in artificial intelligence. After all, Deep Thought plays chess well, but that is all that it does. Even on a hardware level, the machine is specifically tailored to play chess, and such narrow specialization may seem unlikely to illuminate other areas of cognitive performance. What have proved to be avenues of success in chess may not be as promising in other areas. Indeed, even should Deep Thought become word champion, Dreyfus might argue that chess is simply an exceptional case. While the fairly structured environment of chess produces problems that may be solved by heuristic search, general intelligence still requires the peculiarly holistic means of knowing that he reserves to humans.
These cioncerns are well-taken: caution must be exercised in drawing general lessons from the success of computer chess. It is true, for instance, that the lessons learned in developing Deep Thought do not translate directly into such areas as natural language understanding, visual perception, machine learning, etc. However, this is immediately. The more indirect.
The attempt to to look for applications in the wrong direction, and too general lessons to be drawn from computer chess are rather program computers to play chess reveals aspects of machine intelligence in ways similar to how the study of human chess reveals aspects of organic intelligence. For instance, it is also true of human chess skill that it does not generalize well to other areas of cognition. Human chess masters do not tend to be better poets, architects, scientists, or mathematicians. They do not tend to be more intelligent than average, nor have any generally superior cognitive skills (with the possible exception of certain spatial recognition skills). However, one does not study how humans play chess in order to train better poets, architects, scientists, or mathematicians. Rather, such studies indicate how more fundamental human cognitive abilities-such as search strategies, memory capacity and organization, pattern recognition abilities, etc.-are deployed in solving problems. In a similar way, programming computers for chess helps reveal ways that the abilities of computers can be successfully combined and deployed in problem solving domains.
Deep Thought versus Dreyfus
The success of Deep Thought cuts against Dreyfus in particular ways. Dreyfus argues that even though, in principle, a successful chess strategy can be explicitly defined, in practice, the huge number of possible moves available overwhelms the "counting out" strategies that are available to computers. What is necessary for expert performance is the sort of "zeroing in" that he describes, which depends upon the fringe consciousness, ambiguity tolerance, essential vs. inessential discrimination, and perspicuous grouping that belong uniquely to human beings and which allow them to avoid the exhaustive search employed by computers [pp. 120-1281.
In However, Deep Thought is at least a "good" player, yet it essentially does figure out from scratch what to do each time, without "zeroing in"'. Whatever role they play in human expert performance, Deep Thought's expert performance does not depend on the sort of holistic abilities Dreyfus attributes to people. Nor should we think that, for Dreyfus, chess is an isolated case. For example, his brother, Stuart Dreyfus addresses the general problems of dealing with "unstructured" domains:
What are the first principles of recognizing faces? What are the first principles of driving? What are the first principles of recognizing positions in chess? What are the first principle of business? Those are subjects where there are no first principles: areas which are not structured, the kind of area where you can not use a scientific logical fact-based approach. In areas which do not admit to that, then my claim is that intuition is necessary for the highest level of performance [7, p. 751. Given these claims, the success of Deep Thought can be interpreted in two ways. Either (1) it has uncovered hitherto undiscovered "first principles" of chess (leaving open the possibility of discovering such principles for other domains), or (2) it has, succeeded in producing expert-level performance in a genuinely "unstructured" domain. Either way, the necessity of Dreyfus' brand of intuition is called seriously into question.
Deep Thought also serves as a cautionary tale about attempting to model too closely, in computers, nature's solutions to cognitive problems. As Daniel Dennett points out in his article "Cognitive Wheels", with one microscopic exception, nature has never developed the wheel-yet it is the ubiquitous component that serves in artificial stead for all the walking, crawling, flapping, hopping, slithering modes of locomotion developed by nature [4] . By the same token, we should not be too surprised that the artificial intelligence solutions to cognitive problems are different from nature's solutions.
Finally, Dreyfus' preoccupation with "phenomenological" analysis blinkers him to anything but the human case and misleadingly reveals computer limitations without uncovering their strengths. One might expect similar types of difficulties in designing a jetliner that flies the way a bird does, i.e., by flapping its wings. Such a design approach does not appropriately exploit the materials it has available. For instance, the alloy that would quickly fracture if made to flap functions Iperfectly well as an air foil. In a similar way, artificial intelligence approaches must exploit the materials and methods available to them, even if this means sacrificing what Dreyfus calls the phenomenology of intelligence.
Insisting that artificial intelligence systems must preserve a particular phenomenological "feel" is reminiscent of the story of a man who buys a suit from a cut-rate tailor. The suit does not fit well, but the tailor insists that the fault is really with the customer's bad posture. The tailor assures the customer that if he simply pulls in his arm, turns his leg, and raises his left shoulder, the suit will look fine. Skeptical, but in a hurry, the customer shuffles out the door and down the street. He is passed by two other men, who whisper, "Isn't that a sad case of deformity?" "Yes--but didn't the suit fit nice?"
Implementation: holograms, connectionism, and paradigms
The importance of implementation
Questions of implementation play a crucial role in artificial intelligence research. What makes this research simultaneously intriguing and frustrating is the degree of explicit detail required to design and run a sophisticated computer program. Theoretical ambiguities must be resolved, gaps bridged, and speculations cashed out in ways not strictly required in many other disciplines. Even in physics, an. incomplete or ambiguous theory does not cause the physical world to come crashing to a halt. Yet, an AI program may not even operate because of neglected presuppositions so simple that they are usually taken for granted. Against the critic's taunt that computers can only do what they are told, the AI programmer's frequent lament is that typically they won't do even that.
On the other hand, precisely because of this required rigor, when an AI program performs as it is intended, it offers a potential for theoretical confirmation not typically available otherwise, especially in fields such as cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind. Even if the task executed by the program is fairly simple, it offers an existence proof that the task can be accomplished incorporating the underlying assumptions of the program. If it is true that God is in the details, then for artificial intelligence, mind is in the implementation.
Part of the reason for the importance of implementation is that artificial intelligence research attempts to model complex systems, i.e., minds. Electronic computers are crucial to this research because, for the first time, they allow the realization of models that at least approach the required complexity. On the other hand, disciplines like physics, for instance, have often been able to make important progress with relatively simple models (although here, too, computers are playing an increased role, as in the modelling of chaotic systems). A useful way of thinking of these AI computer models is as probes that help characterize a space of possible cognitive systems. Deep Thought, for instance, helps illuminate the extent to which search may be traded for knowledge.
The particular significance of Deep Thought is that it demonstrates that the symbolic, explicit, "counting out" strategies that Dreyfus has characterized as hopeless can actually produce expert-level performance. Traditional AI has risen to the challenge offered by Dreyfus. The ball, so to speak, is now in his court. How well can he respond?
Dreyfus espouses a sort of holism in which, for example, pattern matching and category membership are determined by the degree of resemblance between a situation and a concrete, representative paradigm. Although he does not doubt that "an artificial nervous system sufficiently like the human one, with other features such as sense organs and a body, would be intelligent" [p. 771, he does not think that digital computers, as used by traditional AI, are capable of the requisite holistic processes. Other types of systems, such as holograms or connectionist networks, seem more promising.
However, we think that the promise for Dreyfus' brand of holism is limited. As we point out below, holograms and connectionist networks do not work in quite the holistic way required by Dreyfus. Further, we will argue that the kind of resemblance that must be determined for pattern matching and determining category membership is not a holistic relationship.
Holograms and paradigms
On the level of actual implementation, it is not clear whether Dreyfus has an alternative to offer to that of traditional AI at all. He candidly admits that he does not know how the brain accomplishes much of what it does, but he is convinced that it is not by symbolic information processing. He argues, for instance, that four uniquely human ways of knowing- (l) fringe consciousness, (2) ambiguity tolerance, (3) essential versus inessential discrimination, and (4) However, Dreyfus is sensitive to the fact that serious rivals to the symbolprocessing approach, especially on the nuts and bolts level, are few and far between. Although it may seem clear to Dreyfus that the brain somehow works differently from a computer, the challenge from his symbol-processing opponents, reinforced by their hardware implementations, has been to give some indication of just how.
In the past, part of Dreyfus' response to this challenge has been to invoke holograms. Indeed, in the book Mind over Machine, which he co-authored with his brother Stuart [6] , he goes into some detail about how a hologram can exhibit mind-like properties. It is true that Dreyfus need not argue that the mind is literally like an optical hologram. However, we will examine this account carefully in order to characterize those crucial aspects of mind that Dreyfus thinks can be captured in a way similar to the operations of a holographically-based system. This will also help us characterize those aspects of connectionist systems that he finds attractive.
If light from a hologram of a page of print is superimposed on light from a hologram of a particular character of print from the page, bright spots will appear in locations corresponding to the locations of similar characters on the page. Further, the brightness is proportional to the degree of match so that ill-formed or slightly rotated characters produce somewhat dimmer spots. What Dreyfus finds so intriguing about this is that, . . . the process makes no use of features. According to the information processing assumption, a letter F would be recognized by noting that it has one vertical line and two horizontal lines that intersect but do not cross the vertical, or some other such set of objective features. But in a holographic similarity recognition device two whole wave fronts interact, and the bright spots indicate peaks of energy or resonance. In recognizing similarities that way, the question "similar with respect to what" does not arise. [6, p. 601 At first glance such a system seems to exhibit many of the capabilities Dreyfus claims for human beings, at least for pattern recognition problems. It is relatively flexible, responding to a greater or lesser extent depending upon how closely a given letler resembles a paradigm case of the letter. Further, according to Dreyfus, it accords more closely to the general way in which humans represent categories He claims, . . . that human beings are not aware of classifying objects as instances of abstract rules but rather group objects as more or less distant from an imagined paradigm. [p. 231
Quoting Eleanor Rosch, he continues, "Many experiments have shown that categories appear to be coded in the mind neither by means of lists of each individual member of the category, nor by means of a list of normal criteria, but, rather, in terms of a prototype of a typical category member. The most cognitively economical code for a category is, in fact, a concrete image of an average category member." One paradigm, it seems, is worth a thousand rules. [p. 241
There are versions of connectionist networks that can be implemented in a way that incorporates many of the essential characteristics that Dreyfus finds attractive in a holographically-based recognition system. For instance, a multi-layer connectionist network whose inputs are arranged into a two-dimensional visual array, and whose output units correspond to the 26 letters of the English alphabet, can be trained to respond appropriately when presented with examples of individual letters. The representations of such a network can be distributed throughout the units so that no individual unit or isolable group of units (except the output units) corresponds to a single letter type. Like a holographically-based system, such a network is fairly flexible, responding to a greater or lesser extent depending upon how closely a given letter resembles a paradigm case of the letter.
The importance of these considerations to Dreyfus' case is not the extent to which the brain literally resembles a hologram, or even a connectionist network. It is rather as an existence proof that mind-like capabilities such as pattern recognition may be accomplished without resorting to symbol-processing methods. Unfortunately for Dreyfus, neither of these proposed implementations works in exactly the way he requires.
To begin, Dreyfus is wrong when he says that the question of "similar with respect to what" simply does not arise in the case of holographic recognition. In fact, holographically-matched characters are similar with respect to overall shape and geometry, and such a basis of comparison simply does not properly categorize many characters. For instance, in terms of overall shape and geometry, the five characters outlined in Fig. 3 are more similar to one another than they are to any other surrounding characters, yet the four characters on the top row are each distinct letters. Dreyfus, might argue that the shortcoming lies in comparing the characters to one anothler rather than to an appropriate paradigm. Given a genuinely representative paradigm as a proper basis of comparison, a holographic recognition system might be more successful in classifying the characters as particular letters. However, it is not clear that representatives of even familiar categories cluster around a concrete paradigm. For instance, Fig. 4 , taken from Douglas Hofstadter, shows a wide variety of font types for the letter A [S, p. 2431. If Dreyfus is right, there should be a paradigmatic A, similarity to which defines membership in the category. The difficulty is in trying to find or characterize such a paradigm.
Suppose one were to pick one of the characters in Fig. 4 (it does not matter which) as the paradigmatic example, and then attempt to order all the other examples in terms of their decreasing similarity to the paradigm. What quickly emerges is that there is no unique, unambiguous way of producing this order. In many cases it will simply be unclear the relative degree to which two different characters, resemble the paradigm. The reason for this, of course, is that the required measure of resemblance in the above task is underspecified. Any two Fig. 4 . By permission of Letraset, a division of Esselte Corporation, and Douglas Hofstadter (see [8, p. 2431). letters in Fig. 4 may be similar or dissimilar to each other in a large number of different ways. Their measure of resemblance depends on the chosen bases of comparison-and there's the rub. Given the many distinct ways that similarity may be measured, it seems unlikely that a single, concrete paradigm could capture all of them.
The determination of category membership by similarity to a concrete paradigm becomes particularly problematic when the category is abstract. For example, guitar strings, clock pendulums, and radio tuners are all instances of harmonic oscillators that are readily recognized as such by physicists. However, they are not obviously similar, at least in terms of conformity to a concrete paradigm. The similarities among them are subtle, abstract, and symbolic, involving such concepts as energy potential, restoring force, equilibrium point, etc. Nor is it the case that these underlying concepts are themselves represented by concrete paradigms. For example, the restoring force in a plucked guitar string and in a swinging clock pendulum seem quite distinct. Neither seems to function as a paradigm for the other, nor do they seem like variations on a single, underlying concrete paradigm. Now, to return these considerations to the case of chess, it seems unlikely that meaningful chess patterns are represented by similarity to a concrete paradigm. For instance, chess concepts like attacking and pinning relationships, to be of generalizable use, must be characterized independently of particular pieces or particular positions on the board. Dreyfus himself points out the open-endedness of chess patterns when he says, . . . similarity cannot be defined as having a large number of pieces on identical squares. Two positions which are identical except for one pawn moved to an adjacent square can be totally different, while two positions can be similar although no pieces are on the same square in each [p. 311.
We agree-but this is precisely the reason it remains unclear why Dreyfus thinks that appropriate patterns can be determined by comparison to a concrete paradigm. Indeed, it seems not so much that Dreyfus has an implementational problem, but a conceptual one. Specifying "similar with respect to what" seems essential in any even mildly complex comparison.
Schematic and symbolic alternatives
For all but the simplest patterns, appropriate representations seem to require some sort of schematic structure. For instance, in a discussion of letter types, which generalizes to other sorts of patterns, Douglas Hofstadter suggests that, . . . any concrete letterform is composed of conceptual roles rather than geometric parts. . . . A role . . . does not have a fixed set of parameters . . . but it has instead a set of tests or criteria to be applied to candidates that might be instances of it. . . . (N)ot all tests have to be passed; not all criteria have to be present. Instead, the candidate receives a score computed from the tests and criteria. [8, pp. 279-2801 A candidate with a sufficiently high score is accepted as a member of a given category, one with a mid-range score is accepted tentatively, but one with a sufficiently low score is rejected. But what are roles? Hofstadter says, An example of such a role is that of "crossbar". Note that I am not saying "crossbar in capital 'A",' but merely "crossbar". Roles are modular; they jump across letter boundaries. [8, p. 2801 Although elements are specified for each letter, elements may differ systematically from font type to font type. Therefore, each concrete font type must further specify a description of the way the elements are "filled out," but the overall category schematic need not be so specific.
Hofstadter's discussion parallels the treatment by Holland et al., regarding default hierarchies [9] . A default hierarchy is a cluster of rules containing default expectations about members of a certain category, plus exception rules; e.g., "If X is a bird, then X can fly" is a default expectation, while "If X is a bird with small wings and a large body, then X cannot fly" is an exception rule [9, p. 1821. Like Hofistadter's roles, no criterion is essential. Further, One implication of our view is that it is not necessary to assume that an explicit category prototype, in the sense of an ideal example constructed by averaging presented instances, is either necessary or sufficient to represent all that is induced about category structure. [9, pp. 182-1831 Rather, categories are represented by clusters of rules or characteristics. A particular prototype (or paradigm, to use our previous language) can sometimes be constructed from such rules, if they are specific enough. However, the rules may be sufficiently general that they do not converge on a single instance or prototype..
Thus arises the difficulty in attempting to find a single paradigm of A in Fig. 4 . The rules that define the ways in which elements may fill certain roles in the structure of the letters is relatively open-ended. This means that there is no single instance of A that meets the criteria defined by the rules better than all others. What we seem to find, rather, is sets of criss-crossing relationships that members of a category have in common to a greater of lesser extent, but none of which is singularly necessary or sufficient. There is an echo in all this of Wittgenstein's family resemblance argument.
Wit&enstein , paradigms, and family resemblance
In What Computers Still Can't Do, Dreyfus quotes Wittgenstein on the doctrine of family resemblance:
"We see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: Sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "fam.ily resemblances", . for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc., overlap and criss-cross in the same way. . . . We extend our concept . . . as in spinning a thread we twist fiber on fiber." [p. 1261, [15, p. 321 Dreyfus continues that, Since this sort of recognition of a member of a "family" is accomplished not by a list of traits, but by seeing the case in question in terms of its proximity to a paradigm (i.e., typical) case, such recognition gives us another kind of openness and flexibility. [p. 1261
However, in his haste to enlist Wittgenstein, Dreyfus has missed some crucial points. The first in that, in a family group, there need not be a "typical" member at all. Not only can there be members of the group that have no traits in common, there need not be even a member that has a particularly large numbers of traits found throughout the group. Given the discontinuous way that family resemblances are generated, there may simply be no way to produce a concrete paradigm that is fairly representative of the entire family group.
Secondly, family resemblances are built up from individual similarities between individual members of the family group. That is, while "similar with respect to what" cannot be answered for the entire family group, it can be answered for similarities between individual members. For instance, two members may have the same hair, while two others have the same eyes, etc.
Contrary to Dreyfus, it seems that an appropriate symbolic structure might be useful for representing such relationships. As Dreyfus points out, "Everything is similar to everything else in an indefinitely large number of ways" [p. xxvi]. Why, then do we make some comparisons rather than others-r, in Dreyfus' terms, what are the "constraints on similarity" [p. xxvi]?
A plausible answer is that they are something like the role-filling schematics described by Hofstadter.
For instance, imagine human family resemblance characterized by a frame structure with slots labelled "eyes: shape, color; hair: color, texture; gait; body build; etc." The slots may be instantiated by characteristics of particular individuals. Family resemblance is determined by noting resemblances within slotted categories among individuals.
Such a scheme is fairly open-ended, permitting new but non-identical individuals to be properly categorized, yet constraining the kinds of similarities considered. For instance, "composed of cells" and "attracted by a gravitational field", while both true, are excluded from the family resemblance frame and are not considered.
Of course, it's true that much work remains to be done on just what the proper bases of comparison should be. What does seem clear, however, is that comparison to a concrete paradigm is not an adequate basis for the sorts of comparisons and categorizations we have been considering in this paper.
The schematic structures suggested by Hofstadter also seem appropriate for representing abstract categories such as the harmonic oscillators mentioned above. The roles of energy potential, restoring force, equilibrium point, etc., may be filled out appropriately for concrete examples, yet the schematic of the representation itself need not include the concrete instances. Similarly, chess patterns may be represented schematically. Such concepts as pinned and protecting pieces, forks, attacks, control of central squares, etc., may be represented as roles that can be instantiated in a variety of ways. This is not say that traditional AI has solved all the problems involved in category representation. It certainly has not, and much work remains to be done. However, traditional AI at least has implementational means of enacting its representational principles, such as frame and slot structures coupled with default hierarchies. On the other hand, it is not clear that Dreyfus can show a working implementation of a system that measures similarity to a paradigm in the way he seems to require.
Conchsion: is Dreyfus a degenerating programme?
In the end, what is likely to be Dreyfus' influence on the field of artificial intelligence? Although Dreyfus himself is not an AI researcher, there has been a fair amount of research done that is at least compatible with many of his essential views-enough to construct at least an outline of a research programme. In this sense, Dlreyfus may be said to have an alternative research programme. The question is whether it is a progressive or degenerating one.
We put the question of Dreyfus' influence to several influential workers in AI. The answers were, to say the least, mixed, some of them extreme. For instance, David Israel told us that he had not been influenced by Dreyfus at all, and knew of no researcher who had. On the other hand, Terry Winograd told us that he thought virtually everyone had been influenced by Dreyfus to some degree. More moderately, Bill Clancy said that he had been indirectly influenced by Dreyfus through 'Winograd, but that any influence by Dreyfus had to be placed within the context of previous influence by Ryle, Polyani, Garfinkel, and Wittgenstein.
Marvin Minsky rated Dreyfus' influence at "about a 2 or 3" on a scale of 10. Citing the general usefulness of critics, Minsky allowed that, compared with some other critics, at least Dreyfus was clear. On the other hand, John McCarthy thought that Dreyfus was too vague to offer any useful guidance. Perhaps the most balanced comment was pointed out to us by Daniel Dennett, who allowed that Dreyfus' influence was significant, because his criticisms had been generally on the mark-but perhaps in areas where AI researchers were already discovering the important problems on their own [5] .
Our own assessment is that Dreyfus' influence has been modest and is diminishing. The success of Deep Thought undercuts Dreyfus' analysis of the necessary conditions for intelligence-and even though the introductions to the book have been getting longer, the list of things that computers can't do has actually 'been getting shorter.
Finally, one of the more disturbing aspects of this new edition of What Computers Still Can't Do is that there is virtually no new material. That Dreyfus believes twenty years of research can be addressed in a 50-page introduction is disturbing-that he has new examples but essentially no new arguments is disappointing. That so much of this book stands unaltered, despite the intervening years of research, leads us to wonder whether it is not Dreyfus' criticism that is degenerating.
